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Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one of the most popular multi-attribute decision aid methods. However,
within AHP, there are several competing preference measurement scales and aggregation techniques. In this
paper, we compare these possibilities using a decision problem with an inherent trade-off between two criteria.
A decision-maker has to choose among three alternatives: two extremes and one compromise. Six different
measurement scales described previously in the literature and the new proposed logarithmic scale are considered
for applying the additive and the multiplicative aggregation techniques. The results are compared with the
standard consumer choice theory. We find that with the geometric and power scales a compromise is never
selected when aggregation is additive and rarely when aggregation is multiplicative, while the logarithmic
scale used with the multiplicative aggregation most often selects the compromise that is desirable by consumer
choice theory.
Journal of the Operational Research Society advance online publication, 17 March 2010
doi:10.1057/jors.2010.23
Keywords: decision analysis; multiple criteria analysis; utility theory; additive AHP; multiplicative AHP;
logarithmic scale
1. Introduction
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1977, 1980) is
a multi-criteria decision method applied to a wide variety
of situations with impressive results. The Journal of the
Operational Research Society has recently reported several
successful applications in different areas: Information
Systems (Ahn and Choi, 2008), Supply Chain Management
(Akarte et al, 2001; Sha and Che, 2006; Yeo et al, 2009),
Public services (Fukuyama and Weber, 2002; Mingers et al,
2009), Health (Lee and Kwak, 1999; Li et al, 2009), Strategy
(Leung et al, 2006), E-learning (Tavana, 2006), Defence
(Wheeler, 2006) and Manufacturing (Ban˜uelas and Antony,
2007). There are also several surveys on the success of AHP
(Zahedi, 1986; Golden et al, 1989; Vargas, 1990; Forman and
Gass, 2001; Vaidya and Kumar, 2006; Ho, 2008; Liberatore
and Nydick, 2008).
Although AHP is widely used, the literature has proposed
different variants for the measurement scale and the aggre-
gation of the local priorities, which may lead to different
final results. This may be an advantage as each of the
different ways to model the problem may be suited for a
different application. However, unaware users may apply
∗Correspondence: A Ishizaka, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Busi-
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Hampshire, UK.
AHP incorrectly, which may result in a suboptimal recom-
mendation.
In this paper, we describe a decision problem with an
inherent trade-off between two criteria. For instance, a job
may require two unrelated skills and workers tend not to be
adept at both. We compare the additive AHP and its variant the
multiplicative AHP (MAHP) with the utility theory to eval-
uate the choice among three alternatives: two extremes and
one compromise. The utility theory has a normative approach
and AHP a descriptive or a practical orientation (Winkler,
1990). In this paper, we aim to demonstrate that the aggrega-
tion method of local priorities and the measurement scale in
AHP has a strong influence on the selection of the compro-
mise and therefore on the degree of concordance with the
utility theory.
2. AHP
2.1. General description of the method
At the heart of the AHP method are the comparison matrices
A=(ai, j ), i, j=1, . . . , n, where ai, j are pairwise comparisons
from alternatives/criteria given by the decision-maker on a
verbal scale of nine levels (Table 1). Local priorities ll =li , i =
1, . . . , n are then calculated from these comparison matrices.
Finally, the local priorities are weighted with the criterion
priority and aggregated to give the global priority pi of the
alternatives.
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Table 1 The nine levels of the comparison scale, including the
intermediate levels B, D, F and H
Levels Definitions
A Equal importance
B Equal—weak importance
C Weak importance
D Weak—strong
E Strong importance
F Strong—very strong importance
G Very strong importance
H Very strong—absolute importance
I Absolute importance
An AHP matrix is said perfectly consistent if for all
comparison ai, j respect the following transitivity (1) and
reciprocity (2) rules:
ai, j = ai,k · ak, j , (1)
where i, j and k are any alternatives of the matrix.
ai, j = 1
a j,i
. (2)
However, AHP accepts some inconsistencies in the entries,
which happens in practice. A consistency check must be
applied. Saaty (1977, 1980) has proposed the consistency
index (CI):
CI = max − n
n − 1 , (3)
where n is dimension of the matrix and max is maximal
eigenvalue.
The calculated priorities are plausible only for slightly
inconsistent matrices: if the consistency ratio (CR) (4), ratio
of CI and RI (the average CI of 500 randomly filled matrices),
is less than 10%.
CR = CI
RI
, (4)
where CR is consistency ratio and RI is random index
(Table 2).
Saaty (1977) calculated the random indices as given in
Table 2.
2.2. Measurement scales
One of AHP’s strengths is the possibility to evaluate quantita-
tive and also qualitative criteria and alternatives on the same
preference scale, namely a verbal scale. The use of verbal
responses is intuitively appealing, user friendly and more
common in our everyday lives than numbers. It may also allow
some ambiguity in non-trivial comparisons. To derive prior-
ities, the verbal comparisons must be converted into numer-
ical ones. In Saaty’s AHP, the verbal statements are converted
into integers from 1 to 9. Theoretically there is no reason to
be restricted to these numbers. Therefore, other scales have
been proposed (Table 3). Harker and Vargas (1987) have eval-
uated a quadratic and a root square scale in only one simple
example and argued in favour of Saaty’s 1–9 scale. However,
one example seems not enough to conclude the superiority
of the 1–9 linear scale. The entered comparisons are not
unique: they depend on the decision-maker. Lootsma (1989)
argued that the geometric scale is preferable to the 1–9 linear
scale. Salo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (1997) point out that the inte-
gers from 1 to 9 yield local weights, which are unevenly
dispersed, so that there is lack of sensitivity when comparing
elements, which are preferentially close to each other. Based
on this observation, they propose a balanced scale in which
the local weights are evenly dispersed over the weight range
[0.1, 0.9]. Earlier, Ma and Zheng (1991) have calculated
an inverse linear scale, which also gives more uniformly
distributed priorities than the 1–9 scale. For our study, we
will also propose a logarithmic scale, which is smoother for
high values. Figures 1 and 2 show the used scales in the
study.
Among all the proposed scales, the linear scale with the
integers 1–9 and their reciprocals has been used by far the
most often in applications. Saaty (1980, 1991) advocates
it as the best scale to represent weight ratios. Combined
with cluster techniques, the upper limit scale problem can
be avoided (Saaty, 1991; Ishizaka, 2004a, 2004b). However,
the cited examples deal with objective measurable alterna-
tives like the areas of figures, whereas AHP treats mainly
decision processes on subjective issues. We understand the
difficulty of verifying the effectiveness of scales through
subjective issues. Salo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (1997) demonstrate
the superiority of the balanced scale when comparing two
elements. The choice of the ‘best’ scale is a very heated
debate. Some scientists agree that the choice depends on
the person and the decision problem (Harker and Vargas,
1987; Po¨yho¨nen et al, 1997). Our paper aims to shed some
light on the choice of the appropriate scale and aggregation
technique (see Section 2.3). We will run a complete enumer-
ation with the different type of scales for the additive and
MAHP and then draw a parallel with the consumer choice
theory.
2.3. Aggregation
The calculation of global priorities (pi ) results from the
aggregation of the local priorities (li j ) and the weight (w j )
of the criterion j. Saaty (1977, 1980) has proposed an
additive approach (5). This method has been attacked by
Belton and Gear (1983) and Holder (1990, 1991), because
the introduction of a copy of an alternative or a near copy
(Dyer, 1990) would change the ranking. This phenomenon
is called in the literature ‘rank reversal’. Saaty (1990) and
Harker and Vargas (1990) have defended the method saying
that it is legitimate that the introduction of new informa-
tion (even a copy of the existing one) is able to change the
ranking.
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Table 2 Random indices
N 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RI 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49
Table 3 Different scales for comparing two alternatives (for the comparison of A and B, c = 1 indicates A ≈ B; c> 1 indicates
A>B; when A<B, the reciprocal values 1/c are used)
Scale Definition Parameters
Linear (Saaty, 1977) c = a · x a > 0 ; x = 1, 2, . . . , 9
Power (Harker and Vargas, 1987) c = xa a > 1 ; x = 1, 2, . . . , 9
Geometric (Lootsma, 1989) c = ax−1 a > 1 ; x = 1, 2, . . . , 9
Logarithmic c = loga(x + 1) a > 1 ; x = 1, 2, . . . , 9
Root square (Harker and Vargas, 1987) c = a√x a > 1 ; x = 1, 2, . . . , 9
Inverse linear (Ma and Zheng, 1991) c = 9/(10 − x) x = 1, 2, . . . , 9
Balanced (Salo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 1997) c = w/(1 − w) w = 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, . . . , 0.9
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Values
R
at
in
gs
Linear
Power
Geometric
Logarithmic  
Root square  
Inverse linear  
Balanced  
1 98765432
Figure 1 Graph of the judgement scales used in the study, a = 1 for the linear scale and a = 2 for all other scales.
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Figure 2 Graph of the judgement scales without the geometric and power scales, a =1 for the linear scale and a =2 for all other scale.
Barzilai and Golany (1994), Barzilai (1997) and
Triantaphyllou (2001) argued that the rank reversal problem
in the AHP is due to an erroneous use of the additive aggrega-
tion method. Instead the multiplicative method (6) (Lootsma
et al, 1990; Lootsma, 1993; Leskinen and Kangas, 2005)
should be used. Contrary to the additive AHP, where the sum
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of the criteria weights is equal to the unity
∑
jw j = 1, the
MAHP does not require this normalisation.
pi =
∑
j
w j · li, j (5)
pi =
∏
j
lw ji, j , (6)
where pi is global priority of the alternative i; li, j is local
priority of the alternative i; with respect to the criterion j and
w j is weight of the criterion j.
In response, Vargas (1997) gives an example in which the
exact weight of objects can be retrieved only by an additive
aggregation of the local comparisons. Due to its rank reversal
preservation and its non-linear properties (Triantaphyllou and
Baig, 2005), the MAHP seems to receive a growing attention.
In particular Stam and Duarte Silva (2003) notice that the
additive AHP tends to overweight extreme alternatives, which
seems not to be the case for the MAHP. He suggests that
further research should be done to confirm these observations.
It is the aim of this paper.
3. Theory of consumer choice
3.1. Description of the problem
For our study, we choose a simple multi-criteria decision
problem. This simple problem is not only easy to study, but
it also captures the essence of the choice problem for which
AHP and MAHP is used. Moreover, if AHP fails to handle
adequately this simple problem, it is doubtful that it will be
able to handle a more difficult one.
The problem is as follows. A company has to hire a new
sales engineer. The position requires both engineering and
sales skills. Three candidates with different profiles are avail-
able (see Table 4).
Which candidate will be selected? The consumer choice
theory sets three main axioms about the preferences of the
consumer:
Rationality: The consumer preferences are complete (no
preferences are undefined) and consistent (satisfying
Equations (1) and (2)).1
Monotonicity: The consumer prefers to hire a candidate
who has more skill than less, where skill is being consid-
ered as a normal aptitude or attribute. For example, if
two candidates have the same skill in sales but the first
has more ability in engineering than the second one, the
first candidate will be preferred. The hypothesis implies
that the indifference curves have a negative slope like in
Figure 3.
1 AHP only partially requires this hypothesis.
Table 4 Candidates A, B, C with their respective knowledge
Candidates Engineering skills Sales skills
A High Low
B Medium Medium
C Low High
Skill in engineering
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Figure 3 Three types of indifference curves.
Convexity: Simply, the consumer prefers a mix to the
extremes. For instance, if a consumer is indifferent
to either 10 apples or 10 oranges, then the consumer
prefers 5 apples and 5 oranges to either of these options.
The hypothesis is discussed in introductory economic
textbooks as the ‘law of diminishing marginal rates of
substitution’. It implies that the indifference curves are
upward bowed (all points on a line between two points
on an indifference curve must be on a higher indifference
curve) like in Figure 3.
Indifference curves connect all alternatives (represented
by vectors of attributes) that leave the consumer indifferent.
In Figure 3, the set of curves U1, U2 and U3 have three
different inclinations. They represent the utility of three
different people. Curves U1 are the indifference curves for
a person having symmetric preferences between the impor-
tance of criteria skill in sales and skill in engineering for the
position to fill. Curves U2 correspond to a big importance
in the criterion skill in engineering and curves U3 indicate a
preference for the skill in sales.
The employer will choose the candidate on the highest
indifference curve. For example, in Figure 4, the candidate
B is preferred because he lies on a higher indifference curve
than A and C.
3.2. Decision with the consumer choice theory
We consider the problem of Table 4, where a decision-maker
has to decide between three candidates A, B and C for a
position to fulfil. They have different skills in engineering and
sales. Let sengI and ssalesI be the objectives measures of their
engineering and sales skills for I, one of the three candidates.
A Ishizaka et al—Ranking a compromise alternative in AHP 5
Sk
ill 
in
 s
al
es
 
C
B
A
Skill in engineering 
Figure 4 The candidate B is preferred because he lies on a higher
utility curve of the employer.
From Table 4:
s
eng
A > s
eng
B > s
eng
C (7)
ssalesA < s
sales
B < s
sales
C . (8)
In addition we assume that the compromise alternative is
symmetric with respect to both skill variables, so
s
eng
B = ssalesB . (9)
We assume the decision-maker to have a standard utility
function u (sengI , ssalesI ), which satisfies the assumptions of
Table 4 and depends only on the two engineering and sales
skills. The candidate I with the highest utility u (sengI , ssalesI )
will be preferred.
In order to use AHP, the decision-maker has to estimate
the relative skill cxI,J = sxI /sxJ of candidate I in comparison
to candidate J with respect to his ability in skill x. We are
aware that the cxI,J are subjective and potentially inaccurate
estimates, which must be mapped into a measurement scale,
for example the 1/9, 1/8, . . . 1/2, 1, 2, . . . , 8, 9 Saaty scale.
Hence, we use an inverse mapping that goes from the measure-
ment scale into the ratio of skills. We denote this inverse
mapping as z(x) with the requirement that z(x)> 0, z′(x)> 0
and z(x) = 1/z(1/x) (which implies z(1) = 1). For most of
the analysis, we use the function z(x) = x .
The inequalities (7) and (8) for the absolute skill measures
imply:
c
eng
A,C > c
eng
B,C > 1, c
eng
A,B > 1 (10)
csalesA,C < c
sales
B,C < 1, c
sales
A,B < 1. (11)
Since (1), the transitivity rule cengA,C = cengA,B · cengB,C , holds for
known skills and since both factors in the product are larger
than one, we obtain
c
eng
A,C >max{cengA,B; cengB,C }. (12)
As the transitivity rule is too rigid in our inconsistent
world, we will throughout impose the weak consistency
requirement (12).
Identically for the criterion skill in sales, we can deduce
the weak consistency requirement:
csalesA,C <min{csalesA,B ; csalesB,C }. (13)
For our study, we assume that the skill in engineering and in
sales have the same utility. In AHP, this means that the criteria
skill in sales and skill in engineering are of equal weight.
The comparison cxI,J between candidate I and J as regards
to the criterion x can take 17 values (Table 1). If we evaluate
three alternatives with AHP, 173 =4913 different matrices are
possible. This result must then be squared because we have
two criteria. However, most of these matrices would be highly
inconsistent and do not reflect the problem described in Table
4. To be consistent with our setup, we include the conditions
(9), (10), (11), (12), (13) and we consider only acceptable
inconsistent matrices (CR< 0.1).
Moreover, the number of cases in which the compromise B
is selected depends on the utility function. We now describe
four special cases: the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the
perfect complements, perfect substitutes and the geometric
mean.
In accordance with standard consumer theory, we would
expect that in most cases the consumer would prefer the
compromise alternative B.
(a) Cobb-Douglas
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is the most widely
used utility function in applied and theoretical economics.
Cobb-Douglas preferences have convex indifference
curves and are represented by the utility function
u(x1, x2) = xc1 xd2 , (14)
where c and d are strictly positive numbers.
In our study, we assume that the skill in engineering and in
sales have the same weight in the consumer’s preferences,
that is, c = d . We can also normalise c = d = 1 without
loss of generality.
With the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the compromise
candidate B will be preferred by the decision-maker if:
[sengB ][ssalesB ]  max[[sengA ][ssalesA ]; [sengC ][ssalesC ]]. (15)
The condition (15) can be decomposed in two equations,
one for each candidate:
[sengB ][ssalesB ]  [sengA ][ssalesA ] and
[sengB ][ssalesB ]  [sengC ][ssalesC ]
and by grouping the same skills, we obtain:[
ssalesB
ssalesA
]

[
s
eng
A
s
eng
B
]
and
[
s
eng
B
s
eng
C
]

[
ssalesC
ssalesB
]
.
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Figure 5 Pseudocode for the calculation of the maximum
numbers of B wins.
For any particular inverse mapping z(c12) = s1/s2 from
measurement scales to ratio of skills these become:
z(csalesB,A )> z(c
eng
A,B) and z(c
eng
B,C )> z(c
sales
C,B ).
Since z is positive and increasing, we have:
csalesB,A > c
eng
A,B and c
eng
B,C > c
sales
C,B . (16)
These conditions are the same for any interpretation
the user may have for the comparisons entered into
AHP (represented by different z functions). For the
above, we do not need the symmetry assumption in
(9). This is because the Cobb-Douglas utility function
is the only utility function in which the preference can
be expressed solely in terms of the relative skills cXi, j .
Because AHP only works with these ratios, the Cobb-
Douglas utility function is hence fully compatible with
the AHP approach.
Under the conditions (10)–(13) and (16), the compromise
B would be selected 2379 times (using code similar to
Figure 5).
(b) Perfect complements
Perfect complements are goods that are always consumed
together in fixed proportions. For example, we buy a left
and a right shoe. The indifference curves are L-shaped.
The utility function describing perfect complement pref-
erences is given by:
u(x1, x2) = min[a · x1, b · x2], (17)
where a and b are positive numbers that indicate the
proportions in which the goods are consumed (eg, if a=1
and b = 2, then one would consume two of good x1 for
every one of good x2).
If the decision-maker has perfect-complement preferences
(with a = b), then he would strictly prefer compromise
candidate B over the other candidates if
min[sengB , ssalesB ]>max[min[sengA , ssalesA ],
min[sengC , ssalesC ]]. (18)
Condition (18) can be easily separated into two condi-
tions, one for each alternative:
min[sengB , ssalesB ]>min[sengA , ssalesA ] and
min[sengB , ssalesB ]>min[sengC , ssalesC ]. (19)
Because of condition (9), condition (19) is weaker than
conditions (7) and (8). We therefore use solely the
(10)–(13) and the consistency (CR< 0.1) conditions as
requirement for the selection of candidate B (Figure 5).
With the perfect complements condition, the candidate B
is preferred in all possible 12 650 scenarios.
(c) Perfect substitutes
As both skills have the same importance, indifference
curves of two perfect substitutes goods are all parallel
straight lines with slope of −1. Candidate B is preferred
if and only if
ssalesB + sengB >max[ssalesA + sengA , ssalesC + sengC ]. (20)
Using condition (7)–(9) we can express this condition as
csalesAB + cengAB < 2 and csalesC B + cengC B < 2. (21)
With the conditions (10)–(13), (21), the consistency
condition and the inverse mapping function z(x)= (A −
1 + x)/A for (x > 1) and A/(A − 1 + (1/x)) for x < 1
(where A = 2, 3, 4, . . .), B is selected in 225 cases for
A = 2, 484 cases for A = 3 and 729 cases for A = 4 (see
Figure 6 for the pseudocode).
(d) Geometric mean
While the geometric mean does not have a direct rela-
tionship to a utility function, it has a nice intuitive prop-
erty as a compromise level. In the problem of Table 4,
if the advantage of candidate A over B in engineering is
small compared to that of B over C is, we can write the
inequality:
c
eng
A,B < c
eng
B,C . (22)
If the corresponding statement holds with respect to
sales skill (23), then B is a very attractive compromise
candidate.
csalesC,B < c
sales
B,A . (23)
In terms of absolute skills we get:
s
eng
A
s
eng
B
<
s
eng
B
s
eng
C
or
s
eng
B >
√
s
eng
A · sengC , where sengA > sengC .
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Figure 6 Pseudocode for the calculation of the maximum
numbers of B wins.
Figure 7 Pseudocode for the calculation of the number of times
that B is selected with the geometric mean condition.
Similarly for the sales skill,
ssalesB >
√
ssalesA · ssalesC , where ssalesC > ssalesA .
Thus B’s skill must be better than the geometric mean of the
skills of the others. Note that for such comparisons we do not
need the assumption of symmetry in (9).
With the conditions (10)–(13), (22), (23) and the consis-
tency condition, B is selected in 2115 cases (see Figure 7 for
the pseudocode).
Table 5 Parameters used with the different scales
Scale type Parameters
Linear a = 1
Geometric a = 2
Power a = 2
Logarithmic a = 2
Root square a = 2
4. Decision with AHP and MAHP
4.1. Introduction
In this section, we describe and discuss the hiring decision
problem from Table 4 solved with AHP and MAHP. All
the possible matrix combinations with an acceptable consis-
tency are used with each preference scale. For the MAHP,
four different weights normalisations are applied. Then, we
compare the results of the AHP and MAHP with the consumer
choice theory. The final position of the compromise candi-
date, B, is our particular interest.
4.2. Description
All matrices modelling our problem (ie respecting conditions
(10), (11), (12), (13) and CR< 0.1) are considered with the
seven measurement scales (Table 3) and the two different
aggregation methods. Table 5 indicates the parameters used
in our study.
The priorities are calculated with the normalised geometric
mean, namely,
li = n
√√√√ n∏
j=1
ci, j
/
n∑
j=1
l j , (24)
where li is the priorityof the alternative i, ci, j is the comparison
between i and j and n is the dimension of the matrix.
This calculation provides similar results to the eigenvalue
method for matrices of dimension three (Saaty and Vargas,
1984; Ishizaka, 2004b; Ishizaka and Lusti, 2006).
4.3. Results
We have seen with the standard consumer theory in Section
3.2 that we would expect that in many cases the consumer
would prefer the compromise alternative B. The choice of a
power or geometric scale excludes definitely (for AHP) or
almost definitely (for MAHP) the compromise alternative (see
Table 6). These scales are too extreme. With the other scales,
the MAHP captures the obvious cases in which B should
win (higher scores than the geometric mean and the Cobb-
Douglas). However, it is still below the result of the perfect
complements. The normalisation of the criteria weights has
little impact on the final result. The selection of B with the
traditional AHP is much more difficult.
Saaty’s linear scale 1–9 gives few chances for the alter-
native B to be selected. Only 84 possibilities out of 12 650
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Table 6 Number of combinations where the compromise alternative is selected under AHP
Scale type Additive AHP Multiplicative AHP
∑
w j = 0.5
# of times B wins % of times B wins # of times B wins % of times B wins
Geometric 0 0 1 0
Power 0 0 129 1
Linear 1–9 84 1 4904 39
Logarithmic 444 4 6745 53
Root square 845 7 6197 49
Inverse linear 1179 9 4021 32
Balanced 1213 10 5828 46
Perfect substitutes 225–729 2–6 225–729 2–6
Geometric mean 2115 17 2115 17
Cobb-Douglas 2379 19 2379 19
Perfect complements 12 650 100 12 650 100
Scale type Multiplicative AHP
∑
w j = 1 Multiplicative AHP
∑
w j = 2 Multiplicative AHP
∑
w j = 4
# of times % of times # of times % of times # of times % of times
B wins B wins B wins B wins B wins B wins
Geometric 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 130 1 128 1 128 1
Inverse linear 4021 32 4040 32 4039 32
Linear 1–9 4918 39 4877 39 4908 39
Balanced 5871 46 5888 47 5954 47
Root square 6227 49 6242 49 6260 49
Logarithmic 6750 53 6760 53 6772 54
would yield B, which appears to be an unreasonable result.
Furthermore, in all the 84 cases, B yields a special configura-
tion with the necessary but non-sufficient condition CengA,B = 2
and CsalesB,C = 1/2 (see Section 4.4).
The root square scale (845 selections for B), the balanced
scale (1213) and the inverse linear scale (1179) offer more
possibilities that the compromise alternative will be selected
but still under the geometric mean and Cobb-Douglas criteria
given by the consumer choice theory.
4.4. Example of compromise selection with Saaty’s scale
The compromise will be selected only in a few cases with the
linear scale 1–9 and under the non-sufficient condition that
CengA,B = 2 and CsalesB,C = 1/2. Figure 8 gives one example of
them.
The global priorities are the average of the priorities across
both skills:
A = 1/2 · 0.606 + 1/2 · 0.061 = 0.329
B = 1/2 · 0.333 + 1/2 · 0.353 = 0.343(winner)
C = 1/2 · 0.061 + 1/2 · 0.585 = 0.328
4.5. Surprising example of compromise rejection with
Saaty’s scale
AHP with Saaty’s linear scale 1–9 prefers the extremes
even if a compromise offers a better solution. We have
three candidates:
• A is very good in sales but very poor in engineering
• C is very good in engineering but very poor in sales
• B is very good in sales but not as good as A and he is very
good in engineering but not as good as C.
With the theory of consumer choice (see Section 3), the
candidate B offers a clearly higher utility (under convex or
linear preferences) and should be chosen.
One plausible representation in matrix comparisons could
be given by Figure 9.
The global priorities of this example are as follows:
1. A with 0.355
2. C with 0.355
3. B with 0.290
AHP does not classify the candidate B in first place but in last
place! In order to verify the robustness of the results, a sensi-
tivity analysis was performed (Figure 10). The compromise
alternative B was never selected in this sensitivity analysis.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the additive AHP will over-
rate alternatives with extreme ratings and penalise balanced
ones. In some cases it may be mathematically impossible for
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Figure 8 Example where the compromise candidate B is the best alternative (A=0.329; B=0.343; C=0.328). The CR are acceptable.
(a) Matrix for the engineering skill (CR = 0.01). (b) Matrix for sales skill (CR = 0.03).
A
A
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C
prioritiesC
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9
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31
B
0.655
0.2901/3
0.0551/81/9 
0.0551/91/71A
B
prioritiesA B C
C
0.2901/31
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0.655
Figure 9 Example where the compromise candidate B should be the best alternative but is the worst classified (A=0.0.355; B=0.290;
C = 0.355). The CRs are acceptable. (a) Matrix for the engineering skill (CR = 0.08). (b) Matrix for sales skill (CR = 0.08).
Figure 10 Sensitivity analysis.
Note: The left vertical axis represents the weight of the criteria and the right vertical axis gives the priority of each alternative. The
candidate B is never selected: his line is never on top across any part of the graph.
AHP to select a compromise that achieves the highest overall
ratings. This makes little sense from a practical point of view.
The impact of the preference scales is different with addi-
tive AHP from MAHP. Using additive AHP, the linear scale
1–9 offers very few possibilities for the compromise to be
selected. These scales should be avoided unless we face a
highly concave utility function.
The logarithmic scale, root square scale, inverse linear scale
and balanced scale offer more possibilities for the compro-
mise alternative to be selected, albeit they may ignore some
superior compromises.
We do not suggest any fixed scale as a standard tool for
AHP. This is because the interpretation of verbal expressions
varies from one person to another; however, our observa-
tions confirm the work of Po¨yho¨nen et al (1997), who do
not support Saaty’s scale and prefer a more harmonised scale
such as the balanced scale or the inverse linear scale.
The MAHP, independently of the measurement scale
(apart from the geometric scale and the power scale) and the
normalisation of the weights criteria, ensures due consid-
eration to the compromise alternative when compared
with alternatives extremely attractive with respect to one
10 Journal of the Operational Research Society
criterion and extremely unattractive with respect to the other.
This observation is particularly true for the new proposed
logarithmic scale.
The examples presented here are typical of decision prob-
lems and must hence be taken very seriously. From the
perspective of economists, decision making is almost always
about making compromises. Trying to reach a better outcome
in one dimension is often at the expense of achieving a worse
outcome in another dimension. For instance, the production
cost of a firm can often only be lowered at the expense
of producing lower quality output. It is obvious to most
consumers that if one chooses a lower-priced product (supe-
rior in the price dimension), it is usually at a lower quality
(the other dimension): one gets what one pays for. A good
decision-maker will typically have to correctly trade off one
dimension against another. If a decision aid like the additive
AHP tends to recommend extremes, which are good in only
one respect, it will fail in its purpose. Thus, in addition to
its property of rank reversal preservation, there appears to be
another important advantage to using the MAHP.
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